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Abstract
Emotion regulation impacts the expected emotional responses to the outcomes of risky decisions via activation of cognitive
control strategies. However, whether the regulation of emotional responses to preceding, incidental stimuli also impacts
risk-taking in subsequent decisions is still poorly understood. In this study, we investigated the interplay between the
regulation of incidentally induced emotional responses and subsequent choice behavior using a risky decision-making task
in two independent samples (behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment). We found that overall,
emotion regulation was followed by less risky decisions, which was further reflected in an increase in activation in brain
regions in dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and cingulate cortex. These findings suggest that altering
incidental emotions using reappraisal strategies impacts on subsequent risk-taking in decision-making.
Key words: fMRI; neuroimaging; emotion regulation; reappraisal; valuation; cognitive control; decision-making; risk-taking
Introduction
Trading off risk and reward, for example when working as a
stockbroker or making financial decisions as a company man-
ager,has long been thought to be driven by a purely cognitive and
logical assessment of risk (Westbrook andBraver, 2015).However,
contrary to financial economic accounts of traders as rational
utility maximizers, evidence is building that internal factors
such as emotions (Lerner et al., 2004; Phelps et al., 2014) and
the ability to regulate emotions (Lerner et al., 2015; Heilman and
Houser, 2016) have important effects on their financial decisions.
Thus, effective emotion regulation might be a relevant facet
of trader expertise as it diminishes susceptibility to cognitive
and psychological biases (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Heilman
et al., 2010; Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2012). Most studies investi-
gating the interplay of emotion regulation and decision-making
focused on the regulation of emotions that participants attach to
possible outcomes that they anticipate as a consequence ofmak-
ing decisions (Delgado et al., 2008; Grecucci et al., 2013; Gu et al.,
2013; Hutcherson et al., 2012; Martin and Delgado, 2011;
Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Staudinger
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van’t Wout et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2013). For instance, before
making a risky decision, decision-makers can actively attempt
to change the way they will perceive potential choice outcomes
to minimize the emotional impact on decision-making. In this
case, such emotions directly related to choice outcomes could
either occur during decision-making (current emotions) or after
decision-making (expected emotions) (Loewenstein et al., 2001;
Knutson and Greer, 2008; Schlösser et al., 2013; Lerner et al., 2015).
Only few studies have investigated the effect of regulation of
experimentally induced emotion on risky financial decisions.
One prominent way to minimize the effects of expected
emotions on decision-making is reappraisal, the reframing of
the meaning of an emotional stimulus to alter its emotional
impact (Gross and Thompson, 2007). Engaging in reappraisal of
the decision-situation has been shown to effectively reduce
loss aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009) and increase risk-
taking (Braunstein et al., 2014). Other studies revealed that
greater habitual use of cognitive reappraisal was associated
with a performance advantage in financial decision-making
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011) and with increased risk-taking,
accompanied by decreased sensitivity to changes in risk-
related probabilities and task configurations (Panno et al., 2013).
In contrast, the implementation of imagery-based emotion
regulation (i.e. imagining relaxing scenes) before financial
decision-making was associated with reduced risk-taking
(Martin and Delgado, 2011).
However, there is also a rich literature showing the influ-
ence of incidental emotional stimuli on decision-making in gen-
eral (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003;
Lerner et al., 2004; Winkielman et al., 2005; Han et al., 2007;
Pham, 2007; Seo and Barrett, 2007; Schulreich et al., 2014). Sim-
ilarly, several studies highlighted the carry-over effects of emo-
tionally loaded stimuli, such as erotic images, brand logos and
other highly valenced stimuli, on subsequent financial deci-
sions (e.g. Murawski et al., 2012; Wilson and Daly, 2004). Surpris-
ingly, while these stimuli are designed to elicit strong emotional
responses, the effect of emotion regulation for such incidental
stimuli on subsequent decisions has not received much atten-
tion (Augustine and Larsen, 2011; Kahneman and Frederick,
2007; Miu and Cris¸an, 2011). A few studies, however, have sug-
gested that reappraisal of incidental emotions could be associ-
atedwith increased risk-taking in a subsequent decision-making
task (Heilman et al., 2010; Szasz et al., 2016).
The cognitive control network typically underlying emotion
regulation involves lateral prefrontal cortex (dorsolateral and
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, dlPFC and vlPFC), parietal and
temporal regions as well as somatosensory cortex (Kohn et al.,
2014; Morawetz et al., 2017). Increased responses within this
prefrontal network are usually found to be related to decreased
responses in the amygdala and striatum (Phillips et al., 2008;
Ochsner et al., 2012). Neural networks underlying financial
decision-making and preference formation are similarly spread
across multiple brain regions, including dlPFC, vlPFC, medial
PFC, orbitofrontal cortex, the ventral striatum, anterior cingulate
cortex and posterior parietal regions (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero
and Rangel, 2014; Clithero et al., 2009; Kable and Glimcher, 2007;
Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Voigt et al.,
2018). The regulation of emotions during monetary incentive
tasks has been linked to activity in prefrontal regions, such as
the dlPFC and the vmPFC (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; Staudinger
et al., 2011) and the striatum and the amygdala (Martin and
Delgado, 2011; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; Staudinger et al., 2011).
This suggests that the prefrontal regions might be involved in
implementing the reappraisal-related changes in the decision-
making circuitry by modulating activity in subcortical areas.
Based on these findings, it has been suggested that when
emotion regulation is used to change current and expected
emotions related to a decision, this engages the same neural
circuitry that is regularly found in typical emotion regulation
studies where individuals down-regulate their emotions in
response to aversive stimuli (Phelps et al., 2014). Some of these
regions, however, are also part of the decision-making network,
leaving it an open question as to how much of this network is
shared between functions.
The primary goal of this study was to investigate the effect
of regulation of emotional responses to preceding, incidental
stimuli and subsequent choice behavior. This research ques-
tion, which markedly differs from investigating the regulation
of decision-related emotional responses to anticipated decision
outcomes, allowed for exploring the impact of emotional spill-
over effects on decision-making. In everyday life, we are very
likely to constantly encounter emotional stimuli that are not
directly related to the next decision. This means, understanding
howdealingwith such emotions can impact the next, apparently
unrelated decision process is of utmost importance.
We used a typical emotion regulation task (e.g. Morawetz
et al., 2016a and 2016b), which was followed by a financial risky
decision-making task (Mohr et al., 2010; Majer et al., 2016). Partic-
ipants’ neural responses were measured using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) as well as participants’ skin con-
ductance to quantify physiological arousal responses to relate
those to emotional reactivity and regulation.
Given that the engagement of highly similar neural circuitry
is found in typical emotion regulation tasks and tasks involving
reappraisal to change current/expected emotions and choices,
we hypothesized that carry-over effects of incidental emotions
and their regulation during decision-making would be repre-
sented in systematic activity changes in shared regions.
Materials and methods
Here we report two studies: a behavioral experiment to inves-
tigate the effect of emotion regulation on decision-making, fol-
lowed by an fMRI experiment, which served to investigate the
neural correlates of this process. In two independent samples,
the two experiments used identical experimental paradigms,
which are therefore described together in this section.
Participants
Behavioral experiment: We tested 22 right-handed, healthy par-
ticipants with normal or corrected to normal vision (18 female,
mean age=22.77 years, SD=5.28).
fMRI experiment: We tested 33 right-handed, healthy partic-
ipants with normal or corrected to normal vision. Two partici-
pants had to be excluded due to technical problems with data
acquisition and two other participants were not able to finish
the experiment. The final sample consisted of 29 participants
(13 females, mean age=24.52 years, SD=4.25).
Participants in both experiments gave written, informed con-
sent to participate. The studies were approved by the local ethics
committee of the Department of Education and Psychology at
Freie Universität Berlin.
Stimuli
Stimuli for emotion regulation. Stimuli consisted of 96 aversive
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on a Likert scale from 1 (very negative/very calm) to 9 (very
positive/very arousing):mean valence=2.36,mean arousal = 6.30]
and 48 neutral (normative IAPS ratings: mean valence=5.26,
mean arousal = 3.37) pictures from the IAPS (Bradley and
Lang, 2007). During the experiment, images were presented
in the center of the screen with an 800×600 pixel display
subtending 32◦ × 24◦ visual angle on dual display goggles
(VisuaStim, MR Research, USA) using the stimulation software
Presentation (Version 14.1, Neurobehavioral Systems, USA).
Pictures subtended a 24◦ × 18◦ visual angle, presented against
a black background.
Experimental design and procedure. The first part of each exper-
imental trial was a classical emotion regulation task, which
has been adapted from previous studies on emotion regulation
(Morawetz et al., 2016a, 2016b, 2017). This was followed by a
risky decision-making task. During the instruction phase of the
experiment, we explained the emotion regulation task and the
risky decision-making task in great detail to each participant in
written format aswell as verbally. Participants performed a short
training session before the actual experiment, and they could
ask questions if they were uncertain about any aspects of the
task.
Emotion regulation task. Weused awell-established emotion reg-
ulation task, in which participants regulated their emotions in
response to viewing one of the pictures in each trial. Three task
conditions were implemented (Figure 1): in the Look-Negative
condition, participants were presented with aversive pictures
and were asked to view the stimuli attentively and allow them-
selves to experience/feel any emotional responses, which these
might elicit without manipulating them. The Look-Neutral con-
ditionwas identical; however, the stimuli presented did not elicit
negative emotions. In contrast, in the Decrease condition, par-
ticipants viewed negatively valenced images and were asked to
actively reduce the intensity of negative emotions by distancing
themselves from the image by becoming a detached observer,
e.g. through thinking that the depicted situation is not real, by
reducing the personal relevance of the image or by telling them-
selves that the depicted situation is ‘only a picture’ (Ochsner
et al., 2004; Eippert et al., 2007; Urry et al., 2009). Importantly,
participants were told not to substitute negative emotions with
positive emotions.
Risky decision-making task. The emotion regulation task was
followed by an adjusted version of the Risk Perception in Invest-
ment Decisions task (Mohr et al., 2010; Majer et al., 2016). In this
task, participants were presented with the course of returns of
an investment, i.e. the past performance of a possible invest-
ment. The standard deviation of the return streams and the
expected returns varied parametrically with four standard devi-
ations (σ =2%, 4%, 6% and 8%) and four expected returns (μ =5%,
7%, 9% and 11%), resulting in 16 different combinations of stan-
dard deviations and expected returns (see Supplementary Mate-
rial, Figure S1, for probability distributions). On each trial, par-
ticipants made a choice between an investment with 5% fixed
return (safe investment) and the investment represented by the
return stream shown on the screen (risky investment). Partici-
pants received a flat payment of 15 euros for their participation
in the experiment and a virtual endowment of 100 euros to
invest. They were explicitly told that the returns they observe
during the experiment were randomly drawn from Gaussian
distributions. They were further instructed that after the exper-
iment, one of their 144 choices would be randomly chosen to
determine decision-dependent payments. For example, if the
Fig. 1. Task design. The first part of each trial was an emotion regulation task,
which started with an instruction for 2 s, instructing the participants to either
down-regulate (Decrease) their emotional responses or to simply experience
them (Look). This was followed by a negative (Decrease and Look) or neutral
(Look only) picture presented for 4 s during which the instructed strategy was
applied. After a fixation period (2–6 s), the risky decision-making task followed.
Participants were presented with a possible investment in a portfolio. The past
performance of this portfolio was shown. Participants were asked to choose
between the presented portfolio with varying risk (risky option) or a portfolio
with a fixed 5% return (safe option, not shown) within a 3 s period. After the
decision phase, a fixation period followed (2–6 s). Finally, participants rated their
current emotional state (very negative to very positive) within 3 s. The trial
concluded with a fixation period (2–6 s).
participant would choose the safe option in the respective trial,
she would receive 5 euros (5% of 100 euros) in addition to the
15 euros flat payment. If a participant would choose the risky
option in this trial, a random return was drawn from a Gaussian
distribution with the same mean and standard deviation as the
respective return stream. The resulting outcome (return times
100 euros) was added to or subtracted from the flat payment.
Thus, participants could either win or lose when choosing the
risky option. The optimal strategy was therefore to treat each
decision as a real decision as each had the same probability to
be paid out in the end. Participants could gain a maximum of 21
euros (in addition to the reimbursement for participation) or lose
up to 4 euros.
Task procedures. In the experiment, both tasks were combined
in each trial, i.e. the emotion regulation task was presented first,
followed by the risky decision-making task. Each trial started
with an instruction cue (2 s) indicating the experimental con-
dition by displaying Decrease or Look (note that Look included
both the negative and neutral image condition). Subsequently,
an image was presented for 4 s during which the instructed
strategy had to be applied. This was followed by a fixation cross
for a jittered duration of 2–6 s. After this, participants were
presented with the past returns of a new possible investment
(risky choice option) on the top of the screen. Underneath, two
boxes were displayed on the left or the right side of the fixation
cross, indicating the two choice options (safe investment vs risky
investment). Participants were asked to choose between the safe
and risky option by pressing a button on a two-button fiber
optic response pad (fORP, Cambridge Research Systems Ltd). The
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on the screen was pseudo-randomized between trials to avoid
order effects. This task phase was again followed by a jittered
fixation period for 2–6 s. Next, subjects were asked to rate their
current emotional state on a scale from −5 to +5 (extremely
negative to extremely positive) by pressing a button on the
two-button fORP, providing a measure of trial-by-trial emotion
regulation success. The extremes of the emotional state ratings
were not labeled; only the scale from −5 to +5 was presented.
The response window for the rating was again 3 s. Finally, a
fixation cross was presented in the middle of the screen for a
jittered duration of 2–6 s concluded the trial.
Participants performed three runs of the experiment. Each
run consisted of 48 trials, and each of the 16 resulting return
streams was used in each emotion regulation condition in each
run. One trial lasted 24 s on average, one run lasted about 19min
and thus one scanning session consisted of 144 trials, which
resulted in ∼1 h of scanning.
fMRI data acquisition. Whole brain functional and anatomical
images were acquired using a 3.0 T Magnetom TrioTim MRI
scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) and a 12-channel head
coil. A high-resolution 3D T1-weighted dataset was acquired
for each subject (176 sagittal sections, 1× 1×1 mm3; 256× 256
data acquisition matrix). Functional images were acquired
using a T2∗-weighted, gradient-echo echo planar imaging (EPI)
pulse sequence recording 37 sections oriented parallel to the
anterior and posterior commissure at an in-plane resolution of
3×3×3 mm3 (interslice gap=0; TE=30 ms; TR=2 s; FA=90◦;
FoV=192×192 mm2; 64× 64 data acquisition matrix). For each
experimental run 573 whole brain volumes were recorded.
Data analyses
Behavioral data
Behavioral task performance. We calculated reappraisal success
scores based on the affect ratings acquired after each trial.
Overall reappraisal success was defined as the mean decrease
in reported emotion when applying cognitive reappraisal
(Decrease) relative to the mean affect ratings of the control
condition (Look-Negative), the latter representing the ‘natural’
emotional response to the stimuli (Morawetz et al., 2016a, 2016b;
Wager et al., 2008). Reappraisal success scores for Decrease
(Decrease minus Look-Negative) for each participant were
calculated and used to analyze how these related to decision-
making, i.e. whether emotion regulation per se affected choice
behavior or whether the effect of emotion regulation on choice
behavior depended on regulation success.
As a sanity check, we also analyzed electrodermal activity




Functional imaging data analysis was performed using SPM12
(Wellcome Institute for Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). As
interleaved slice acquisition was used, slice time correction was
included during the preprocessing of the fMRI data (Sladky et al.,
2011). In addition, standard preprocessing involved realignment
to the mean image, spatial normalization to the standard EPI
template (MNI template, as implemented in SPM8) and spatial
smoothing with an 8 mm full-width at half-maximum isotopic
Gaussian kernel.
General linear models
We used several general linear models (GLMS) to analyze the
data.. GLM1. A first GLM was estimated to investigate risky
decision-making and identify the emotion regulation network.
This model included the following regressors: instruction cue
(duration 2 s), emotion regulation conditions (Decrease, Look-
Negative, Look-Neutral) (duration 4 s), type of choice (Risky
Choices, Safe Choices) (duration 3 s), rating phase (duration 3 s).
This model included motion parameters as nuisance covariates.
The regressors were convolved with a canonical form of the
hemodynamic response. Contrast images of brain activations
associated with decision-making (Risky Choices>Safe Choices
and Safe Choices>Risky Choices) were calculated for each
participant and used in a second-level analysis. Contrast
images of brain activations associated with emotion regulation
(Decrease>Look-Negative; Decrease>Look-Neutral; Look-
Negative>Decrease; Look-Neutral>Decrease) and emotion
reactivity (Look-Negative>Look-Neutral; Look-Neutral>Look-
Negative) were produced for each participant. T-statistics
for each voxel were thresholded at P <0.05 corrected for
multiple comparisons across whole brain with family wise error
(FWE) rate.
GLM2. This model was designed to identify regions whose
activity increased during risky decision-making as a function
of the emotion regulation condition. For this, the regressors
for the choice phase were split into more specific regressors
compared to the previous GLMs, specifying the choice outcomes
in relation to the preceding emotion regulation condition. It
included the following regressors: instruction cue (duration 2 s),
emotion regulation conditions (Decrease, Look-Negative, Look-
Neutral) (duration 4 s), type of choice (Risky ChoicesDecrease, Risky
ChoicesLook-Negative, Risky ChoicesLook-Neutral, Safe ChoicesDecrease,
Safe ChoicesLook-Negative, Risky ChoicesLook-Neutral) (3 s) and rating
(duration 3 s). This model again included motion parameters
as nuisance covariates. The regressors were convolved with
a canonical form of the hemodynamic response. Contrast
images of brain activations associated with risky decision-
making following experiencing negative emotions (Risky
ChoicesLook-Negative >Risky ChoicesLook-Neutral; Risky
ChoicesLook-Neutral >Risky ChoicesLook-Negative) and emotion reg-
ulation (Risky ChoicesDecrease >Risky ChoicesLook-Negative; Risky
ChoicesDecrease >Risky ChoicesLook-Neutral; Risky ChoicesLook-Negative
>Risky ChoicesDecrease; Risky ChoicesLook-Neutral >Risky
ChoicesDecrease) were calculated and used in a second-level
analysis. T-statistics for each voxel were thresholded at P <0.05




Emotion regulation task. A significant main effect of task
was found (F(1,21) = 157.87, P <0.001). Post-hoc t-tests revealed
significantly more negative emotional state ratings for Look-
Negative compared to Look-Neutral (t(21) =−14.37, P <0.001,
Cohen’s d =4.61) and for Look-Negative compared to Decrease
(t(21) =−10.61, P <0.001, Cohen’s d =1.24). Decrease also resulted
in more negative emotional state ratings than Look-Neutral
(t(21) =−10.71, P <0.001, Cohen’s d =3.22).
Risky decision-making task. A significant main effect of task was
observed (F(1,21) = 4.21, P <0.05). Post-hoc t-tests showed that
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Fig. 2. Physiological and behavioral results. (A) Emotional state ratings after each trial (fMRI study). The subjective ratings of emotional states indicated fewer
negative emotions after the down-regulation of emotions compared to Look-Negative. During the Look-Neutral condition, participants rated their emotional state
to be significantly less negative compared to the Decrease and Look-Negative condition. (B) Percent risky choices as a function of preceding emotion regulation (fMRI
study). After emotion regulation, participants showed less risk-taking behavior, i.e. they chose the safe option more often compared to the Look-Negative condition.
∗ indicates P <0.05; ∗∗ indicates P < 0.01; ∗∗∗ indicates P <0.001.
regulation (Decrease) as compared to Look-Negative (t(21) =−2.11,
P <0.05, Cohen’s d =0.24) and as compared to Look-Neutral
(t(21) =−3.45, P <0.01, Cohen’s d =0.56). Reaction times during
the risky decision-making task did not differ after emotion
induction and regulation (all P > 0.1, data not shown).
fMRI study
Emotion induction. After the fMRI experiment, participants rated
all the images on valence and arousal using a nine-point Likert
scale from 1 (very negative/very calm) to 9 (very positive/very
arousing). The images a priori selected to be perceived as
‘negative’ were indeed rated as more negative (t(25) = 15.10,
P <0.001, Cohen’s d =4.48) and more arousing (t(25) = 11.36,
P <0.001, Cohen’s d =3.05) than the ‘neutral’ images, confirming
the normative ratings (Bradley and Lang, 2007). The available
skin conductance data provided support for the success of the
emotion induction (Figure S2).
Emotion regulation task. A significant main effect of task was
found (F(1,28) = 103.53, P <0.001) (Figure 2A). Post-hoc t-tests
revealed significantly more negative emotional state ratings
for Look-Negative as compared to Look-Neutral (t(28) =−11.00,
P<0.001, Cohen’s d =3.48) and for Look-Negative as compared to
Decrease (t(28) =−7.13, P <0.001, Cohen’s d =1.12). Decrease also
resulted in more negative emotional state ratings than Look-
Neutral (t(28) =−9.75, P <0.001, Cohen’s d =2.76). These results
again confirm that emotion regulation was successful.
Risky decision-making task. First, we confirmed that participants
again preferred the safe over the risky option after Decrease
compared to Look-Negative (t(28) =−2.34, P <0.05, Cohen’s
d =0.16). The differences between Decrease and Look-Neutral
(t(28) =−1.48, P =0.15, Cohen’s d =0.01) as well as Look-Negative
and Look-Neutral (t(28) = 0.16,P =0.88,Cohen’s d =0.14)were non-
significant (Figure 2B). Reaction times during the risky decision-
making task did not differ after Look-Negative and Decrease (all
P > 0.1; data not shown).
Second, we performed two control analyses to investigate (i)
the effect of emotion regulation success on subsequent choices
and (ii) the effect of arousal on choices during the decision phase.
The results can be found in the Supplementary Materials.
fMRI results
In a first step (based on GLM1), we performed two control
analyses that mainly served as a general sanity check. First, we
tested for neuronal correlates of emotion regulation. For this, we
performed a conjunction analysis [(Decrease>Look-Negative)
& (Decrease>Look-Neutral)]. The results revealed increased
activity in the left IFG and the supplementary motor area (SMA)
(Table 1). Contrasting the Decrease condition with Look-Neutral
revealed increased activity in a widespread network of regions
including frontal (IFG), temporal and parietal regions (Table 1).
The observed network aligns with our previous findings on the
general emotion regulation network (Morawetz et al., 2017).
Second, we investigated which regions were implicated in
risk-related decision-making in general by contrasting risky
vs safe decisions (Risky Choices>Safe Choices), independent
of the emotion regulation conditions, and found an increase
in activity in the vmPFC, the right dlPFC as well as the
thalamus (Table 2). These findings are in line with a previous
meta-analysis on value-based decision-making (Bartra et al.,
2013).
In a second step (based on GLM2), we identified the
brain regions linked to risky decision-making when regu-
lating emotions. More specifically, we tested whether the
experience of emotional responses affected neural activity
during risky decision-making (Risky ChoicesLook-Negative >Risky
ChoicesLook-Neutral). The results revealed increased activity in the
bilateral dlPFC (Figure 3A, Table 2). Next, we investigated the
neural activity related to the preference for risky options over
safe options after emotion regulation. For this, we contrasted
(Risky ChoicesDecrease >Risky ChoicesLook-Neutral) and observed
enhanced activity in left dlPFC, left vlPFC and cingulate cortex
(Figure 3B, Table 2). The reverse contrasts for neural activity
during safe decision-making did not reveal any significant
differences in a whole-brain analysis (Table 2).
In a third step, we determined in an explorative manner the
overlap of regions implicated in the emotion regulation and risky
decision-making in general, by combining the contrasts of both
task phases. An overlap in activity between the contrasts (Risky
Choices Decrease >Risky ChoicesLook-Neutral) and [(Decrease>Look-
Negative) & (Decrease>Look-Neutral)] was found in the left
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Table 2. Risky decision-making task
Contrast Region L/R size t-value P (FWE-corr.) Coordinates
x y z
Risky Choices>Safe Choices Anterior cingulum/vmPFC L 196 5.08 0.001 −3 41 8
Thalamus R 105 4.50 0.02 6 −7 5
Superior frontal gyrus/dlPFC R 80 4.25 0.05 18 41 44
Safe Choices>Risky Choices No significant clusters
Risky ChoicesDecrease >Risky
ChoicesLook-Neutral
Superior frontal gyrus/dlPFC L 176 4.55 0.003 −24 41 32
Cingulum L 109 4.50 0.02 −21 −46 29
Inferior occipital gyrus R 94 4.20 0.03 3 9 −88 −4












Superior frontal gyrus/dlPFC R 116 4.37 0.01 21 59 20






















L= left. R = right. Coordinates refer to MNI coordinate system. P < 0.05 FWE corrected (k =10).
regulation on risky decision-making could be a direct carry-over
effect from the emotion regulation task.
Discussion
Our findings showed that emotion regulation of incidental emo-
tions effectively reduced the experience of negative emotions
and subsequently resulted in decreased risk-taking in two inde-
pendent samples.This carry-over effect of emotion regulation on
decision-making was reflected in increased activity in ventro-
lateral and dorsolateral prefrontal regions and cingulate cortex.
Furthermore, we found evidence for a shared neural substrate
for emotion regulation and risky decision-making in left vlPFC.
Together, these findings suggest that emotion reappraisal can
alter risk-related decision-making even if the emotional stimu-
lus is incidental.
Effect of reappraisal of incidental emotions on
risky decision-making
Behaviorally, our results both confirm and contradict previous
studies. On the one hand, previous studies support the idea
that emotion regulation leads to increased risk-taking behavior
(Heilman et al., 2010; Braunstein et al., 2014; Panno et al., 2013), as
individuals who successfully regulate their negative emotions
tend to make choices that maximize performance (Seo and
Barrett, 2007) and place less weight on the outcome of a single
decision, which in turn reduces loss aversion (Sokol-Hessner
et al., 2013; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). On the other hand, Martin
and Delgado (2011) reported that reappraisal leads to more
goal-directed behavior and promotes less risk-taking behavior.
Our findings indicate that reappraisal of current emotions was
linked to less risky choices. One pathway for this effect might
be that emotion regulation neutralizes the negative emotional
state as the decision-maker becomes aware of, and actively
manages, their negative affective experience (Forgas, 2000;
Forgas and Ciarrochi, 2002). This could then lead to a carry-over
effect of enhanced cognitive control into the decision stage and,
as a by-product, decrease risk-taking. Note, however, that this
interpretation depends on the definition of goal-directedness
in this scenario and only holds if resisting the temptation of
making a risky choice (as in gambling) is regarded as requiring
more cognitive control than the other way around. Alternatively,
onemight argue that emotion regulation could simply neutralize
the impact of the negative emotional experience that would
otherwise carry-over into the decision-phase and increase risk-
taking. However, our finding that there was no difference in risk-
taking between the passive viewing conditions involving nega-
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Fig. 3. (A) Risky choices after Look-Negative. The contrast (Risky
ChoicesLook-Negative >Risky ChoicesLook-Neutral) yielded increased activity in
bilateral dlPFC. (B) Risky choices after emotion regulation. The effect of emotion
regulation on risky choices (Risky ChoicesDecrease >Risky ChoicesLook-Neutral)
yielded increased activity in the left dlPFC, left vlPFC and cingulate cortex.
This means, in our study, it was the regulation of a preceding
negative experience rather than the negative experience per se
that impacted subsequent incidental decision-making.
There are three major differences between our study and
earlier studies investigating emotion regulation and decision-
making that might explain some of the discrepancies in find-
ings. Firstly, we induced incidental negative emotions before
each decision, meaning that participants regulated emotional
responses that were not related to the decision process per se.
In contrast, in some previous studies participants were asked
to emphasize or deemphasize the importance of an upcom-
ing decision (e.g. Braunstein et al., 2014; Sokol-Hessner et al.,
2009; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013). This means that unlike in our
study, in those previous studies no explicit emotional stimulus
was present at the time of regulation, rather, the emotions
were expected to arise from the decision-making process. Reg-
ulating emotions related to potential decision outcomes could
arguably lead to a very different profile of choices. Secondly,
we instructed participants to use reappraisal to regulate their
emotions by implementing tactics such as reality change or dis-
tancing (McRae et al.,2012).However, other studies used different
strategies to reduce emotions such as taking the perspective
of a trader (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009) or imagine a calming
scene such as a sunny day in a park (Martin and Delgado, 2011).
These differences in regulation strategy could potentially also
lead to differences in choice profiles. Thirdly, we did not provide
immediate feedback on participants’ choices that could have
triggered emotional processes as in other studies (Sokol-Hessner
et al., 2013; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Staudinger et al., 2011;
Staudinger et al., 2009). This again fully decoupled the emo-
tional response from the decision-making process and allowed
us to isolate incidental regulation-related processes. There is
one other study that we are aware of that induced incidental
emotions using negative film clips before risky decision-making
(Heilman et al., 2010). These authors used the Balloon Analogue
Risk Task in which participants can earn financial rewards by
‘pumping up’ balloons presented on the screen. However, as the
balloons have variable, unknown explosion points, and partici-
pants lose when the breaking point is reached, emotion regula-
tion might also extend to feedback/outcome-related emotions,
or expectation of those. In contrast, in our task emotion regu-
lation was more directly attributable to the emotional stimulus
alone as no feedback was provided for risky choices.
It is important to note, however, that our study, likemost oth-
ers in the field,did not explicitly investigate the effect of a variety
of specific negative (or positive) emotions, or the regulation
of such, nor did it systematically vary the type of decision task
and risk or include specific groups of decision-makers. It is also
conceivable that in other decision scenarios, choosing the risky
option might always be the optimal choice, and it is not clear
whether the impact of emotion regulation on such choiceswould
be different. It therefore remains to be seen how well our results
generalize to other emotion and decision scenarios.
Neural networks underlying the effect of emo-
tion regulation on risky decision-making
We found that the modulatory effect of cognitive reappraisal
of incidental emotions on decision-making was primarily asso-
ciated with increased activity in dlPFC and vlPFC. Our findings
extend previous studies that only reported an increase in activity
in the dlPFC when individuals engaged in reappraisal to change
emotional responses and choices (Grecucci et al., 2013; Hutcher-
son et al., 2012; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013; Staudinger et al., 2011).
Moreover, we found that the left vlPFC was implicated in the
emotion regulation process as well as in the decision-making
process. In the context of emotion regulation, dlPFC has been
associated with top-down cognitive control processes involved
in attention and working memory (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002;
Rottschy et al., 2012; Nee et al., 2013; Vossel et al., 2014; Cieslik
et al., 2015), while vlPFC has been implicated in top-down
outcome-based language-related appraisal processes (Kohn
et al., 2014; Liakakis et al., 2011; Messina et al., 2015; Morawetz
et al., 2016a). Both regions seem to be part of a self-regulating
feedback loop during reappraisal (Morawetz et al., 2016b).
Our findings suggest that the impact of emotion regulation
on the decision process is modulated by this shared neural
network. Of course, our results do not provide direct evidence
that both processes are neurally integrated in these regions, but
the shared cognitive functions, in particular in cognitive control
processes, might suggest such an explanation. A pre-activation
of cognitive control regions during emotion regulation could lead
to spill-over effects to cognitive control in risk-related decision-
making, again lending support to the view that it was the regula-
tion process and not the absence of negative emotions that was
related to the altered choice patterns. Thus, our findings suggest
that emotion regulatory processes in general play a critical role
in value computation, and that changes in emotional states can
be associated with changes in choice outcomes, even when the
emotions are not directly related to any aspects of the decisions
per se.
Conclusions
Our results extend earlier work on emotion regulation and
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ulation of incidental emotions affected risk-taking in decision-
making, potentially because cognitive control processes carried
over to the decision stage in the absence of immediate outcome
feedback. Second, our study provides insights into the possible
neural networks underlying emotion regulation of incidental
emotions and subsequent decision-making, supporting the
view of multiple modulatory neural circuits (Phelps et al.,
2014). Our study provides a first step toward a more nuanced
understanding of the relationship between emotion regulation
and decision-making.
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Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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